• In (1)-(3), the presupposition is that Adam ate the apple. This is the explanandum in each case. So, what is different between (1)-(3)?
• The difference between (1)-(3) is a difference in contrast class. In (1) the contrast class would consist in other people having eaten the apple. In (2), it would be Adam doing other things to the apple, and in (3), it would be Adam eating something other than the apple.
• Intuitively, answers which are appropriate for (1) may not be appropriate for (2) or (3). For instance, depending on the context, it might be somewhat odd to answer (2) by saying "Because Eve wasn't hungry." But, in the same context, this might be a good answer to (1).
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• The contrast class for (1) might be {Adam ate the apple, Eve ate the apple, the serpent ate the apple, the goat ate the apple}.
• The contrast class for (2) might be {Adam ate the apple, Adam threw the apple away, Adam fed the apple to the goat}.
• The contrast class for (3) might be {Adam ate the apple, Adam ate the pear, Adam ate the pomegranate}.
• It should be now be clear that more than just the explanandum is presupposed in a (fully-fleshed-out) why-question. It is also presupposed that only one member of the contrast class can be true.
• Presumably, it is also presupposed that there is some answer to the why question. That is, it is presupposed that there is some true proposition that would count as an answer to the why-question.
• Let X = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k , . . . } be the contrast class of the why-question, and let P k be the explanandum or the topic of the why-question.
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• The presupposition of a why-question Q (in context K) is given by:
(c) There is at least one true proposition A which would count as an answer to Q, relative to contrast class X, in context K.
• Van Fraassen states (c) slightly differently. He puts (c) in terms of A's being "relevant" (bearing a "relevance relation" R) to P k , X . I prefer not to do it this way (for reasons which will become clear later on).
• Also, Van Fraassen does not explicitly build the context K into his formal account (this is also a mistake, I think, as we'll see . . . ).
• Now, a direct answer to Q will be of the form:
• Here, A is called the core of an answer to the why-question Q. 
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• Now, the following conditions must be met if (*) is to qualify as a direct answer to Q (with implicit contrast class X, and in context K).
(i) A is true.
(ii) P k is true.
(iii) No member of X other than P k is true.
(iv) A counts as an answer to Q, rel. to contrast class X, in context K.
• This may sound circular, but I think something interesting can be said about (iv) to give it a more precise and non-circular character.
• Van Fraassen avoids sounding circular by stating (iv) in terms of A's being "relevant" to P k , X , but he ends-up with a somewhat trivial-sounding account, as will be seen below in examples of Salmon.
• We need to say something more about (iv) here. First, let's discuss Salmon's "triviality" criticism of Van Fraassen's account.
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• Van Fraassen states (iv) as follows:
• Here, R is supposed to be a "relevance relation." The idea is that the answer A should be "relevant" to P k relative to X.
• Van Fraassen does not say much about what R should be. He suggests that it is "determined by the context" in which the question is asked. And, he says that "scientific" explanations are just going to be ones which emanate from (or are evaluated using) "scientific" theories.
• Salmon and Kitcher argue that -according to VF -virtually anything can count as an answer to just about any why-question, because VF does not place constraints on the "relevance relation" R.
• Next, I will examine the example of Salmon and Kitcher. Then, I will try to more charitably reconstruct VF's pragmatic theory. • Then, consider the following answer to "Why did JFK die 11/22/63."
where A is a true description of the configurations of the planets, sun, moon, and stars at the time of JFK's birth [so A bears R to P k , X ].
• It appears that (*) satisfies all of VF's requirements for a direct answer to a why-question. After all, A is "astrologically relevant" to P k , X .
• There are two questions we must ask at this point.
-Must VF say that (*) is an answer to Q?
-Must VF say that (*) is a "good" (or "scientific") answer to Q?
• I think the answers to these questions are "yes" and "no" . . .
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• VF gives an account of what it means for A to be a good answer to Q:
-Is A probable, relative to our background knowledge (in K)?
-How does A compare with other competing answers (in K)? * Are any other answers more probable than A (in K)? * Do any other answers more strongly favor P k over P j (in K)? * Do any other answers render A irrelevant to P k vs. P j (in K)?
• As I read VF, he's saying that A will be a good (and best) answer (in K), as compared to a set of alternative answers {A i }, provided that:
• f (P k , P j , A | K) is the degree to which A favors P k over P j , given K.
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• VF does not endorse a particular probabilistic relevance measure f (P k , P j , A | K) of the degree to which A favors P k over P j , given K. But, I would suggest a likelihood-ratio based measure here:
• Salmon and Kitcher claim that all four evaluative criteria are met:
. . . since we have excellent astronomical records we have (1.1) practical certainty regarding the celestial configuration (A) at the time of JFK's birth.
In the second place, we must suppose (2) that the astrologer can derive from A, by means of astrological theory, that JFK was more likely to die on 11/22 than on any other day of 1963, and also that JFK was more likely to die on 11/22 than to survive 1963. . . . Moreover, (1.2) no other "astrologically relevant" answer A i could be more probable than A. And, finally, (3) no other "astrologically relevant" answer could favor P k over P j more strongly than A does, and (4) no other "astrologically relevant" answer A i could render A irrelevant to P k vs. P j (presumably, we get (1.2), (3), and (4) from the fact that A is an "astrologically complete" set of "initial conditions").
✬ ✫ ✩ ✪
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• Before we get to evaluating Salmon and Kitcher's objection to VF's theory, let's re-consider how "progmatic explanation" works.
• It seems to me that there is more that is presupposed in the context of a why-question. It seems to me that the following is also presupposed:
• What ( †) says is that our background knowledge does not already favor P k over all other P j members of the contrast class X (in K).
• If ( †) were violated, then there would be no need for an "explanation"!
• Of course, K cannot include the explanandum (since this woukld make Pr(P k | K) = 1). This is the familiar problem about explanations that we saw in previous probabilistic theries of explanation. [Remind you of the "problem of old evidence"? We already know that P k is true, and we are looking for a "theory" which "explains" or "predicts" P k . And, we want to use P k to discriminate alternative "explanations."]
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• Back to Salmon, Kitcher, and VF. Salmon and Kitcher seem to think that no constraints on VF's "relevance relation" are implicit in his theory. This is a bit unfair. It seems to me that plenty of constraints are implicit in the account of a good answer to a why question.
• Indeed, (1)- (4) are non-trivial probabilistic constraints on what counts as a "relevant" answer. And, we can see much more clearly how the context K comes into play here. It is the reference class for Pr!
• Perhaps Kitcher's point is that since K can vary widely, so can what will count as a "good" or "relevant" answer to a why-question.
• But, is this right? I think a much more charitable and accurate reading of VF is that he is thinking of "explanation" as an empirical phenomenon (VF is, after all, an empiricist who eschews modality!).
• Exactly how would a charitable, empiricist reading of VF's account go? I think it would be based on the notion of prediction . . .
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• If explanation is to have any real value in an empiricist philosophy of science, it had better answer to a predictive criterion!
• Here's a more charitable reading of VF's on scientific explanation.
• A scientific answer A to a why-question Q is a prediction of P k (vs. P j ) made by (or derived from) a scientific theory T , together with background knowledge K (circumscribed by context).
• An answer A to Q is "better than" a collection of alternative answers {A i } if T better predicts P k (vs. P j ) than each T i does, relative to K.
• Thus, the "rules of the explanation game" are just the "rules of the prediction (or confirmation) game" (just as an empiricist would want).
• Now, how does VF handle the Salmon/Kitcher example? Easily. Do Salmon and Kitcher really want to say that the "astrological theory" predicts the date of JFK's death? Of course not. All the astrological theory does is accomodate a datum which we already know.
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• Bayesianism can be used to show that prediction leads to stronger confirmation of a theory than mere accomodation does. See Patrick Maher's paper "Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery" [PSA, vol. 1 (1988): 273-285] for an elegant account.
• I think that's all one needs to defend VF's theory from the "astrology" example. In general, this strategy will block examples in which a worse predictive account is claimed to be a better "explanation" or "answer".
• One could still object to this account on the grounds that it is too "superficial" or "empirical", and that it cannot get at the "deep" "modal" content of "real" (causal?) explanations. Of course, this would just reduce the the age-old debate between realists and empiricists, and would have nothhing in particular to do with explanation per se.
• The real issues involve the goals of scientific inquiry. Does science aim for "deeply explanatory" or just predictively accurate theories?
